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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 8, 1996, the tortoise of federal law finally caught up with
the hare of communications technology. After more than a half-century of
broadcast regulation under the Communications Act of 1934,' a dozen
years of tinkering with cable television,2 and more than a decade of
telephone supervision by Judge Greene,' Congress passed, and President
Clinton signed, the Telecommunications Act of 1996.'
This law represents a vision of a telecommunications marketplace
where the flexibility and innovation of competition replaces the heavy hand
of regulation. It is based on the premise that technological changes will
permit a flourishing of telecommunications carriers, engaged in head-to-
head competition, resulting in a multitude of communications carriers and
programmers being made available to the American consumer.
Ironically, it is the convergence of technology that is to lead to a
diverse telecommunications marketplace.5 If the same physical plant can
-1. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat.
2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559); Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (some sections codified
throughout 47 U.S.C.; other sections uncodified). In this Article, I will refer to "the Cable
Act" to refer to cable law at the time the 1996 Telecommunications was passed. I will refer
to the" 1984 Cable Act" or the "1992 Cable Act' to reference particular sections from those
laws.
3. Judge Harold Greene oversaw the break-up of the AT&T, beginning with approval
of an antitrust settlement in United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) and numerous decisions that
followed.
4. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified
at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). Unfortunately for lawyers and judges trying to discuss
this Act, there is no uniform way to refer to all the sections. Some are codified, some are
not. For ease of reference, the following convention will be used: When a provision is
codified, it will be referred to by both its section number within the Act itself as well as by
its U.S.C. section; uncodified sections will be referred to by their particular section number
within the Act itself.
The most important legislative history for the 1996 Act is the report that was issued by
the House-Senate Conference which reported the final version of the bill, Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458 (1996).
5. One definition of convergence is "the combination of both new and existing
media--e.g., broadcasting, cable, fiber optics, satellites-into one integrated system for
delivery of video, voice, and data." Michael H. Botein, Antitrustlssues in the Telecommu-
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offer local and long-distance telephone service, provide cable television
programming, and carry voice, data, and video signals, then competing
systems offering the whole package, as well as selected sub-parts, can
replace localized monopolies.
There is no guarantee, however, that true competition will flourish,
and it is certainly possible that unregulated fiefdoms will soon dot the
electronic landscape. The 1996 Act is an experiment, as, one would have
to admit, all telecommunications regulation is an experiment.6
Whether or not the devil is in the details, the future of telecommuni-
cations regulation can only be appreciated with, at least, a preliminary
understanding of the specific details of the Act.7 This Article represents an
effort to provide a guided tour through the major provisions of the 1996
Act.
Section II describes the new regime for telecommunications in general,
and telephone in particular. Section Im describes the newest cable
regulation, while Section IV details the changes in broadcast regulation.
Section V describes the major attempt to regulate content, rather than
conduit, in the 1996 Act.
I. FROM TELEPHONE TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The goal of Congress was to create a legislative change as dramatic
as the evolution of the old-fashioned telephone, carrying voices over distant
wires, into telecommunications, the transmission of "information," including
data and video, as well as aural communications.' Accordingly, Congress
decided that the monopolistic local telephone company must be forced to
share its market, while at the same time, be permitted into both the free
wheeling competitive world of long-distance service and the potentially
competitive video market as well. In the words of the FCC: "In the old
regulatory regime, government encouraged monopolies. In the new
regulatory regime, we and the states remove the outdated barriers that
protect monopolies from competition and affirmatively promote efficient
competition using tools forged by Congress."9
nications and Software Industries, 25 Sw. U.L. REV. 569, 569 (1996).
6. Cf Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (describing
the theory of free speech by stating, "It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.").
7. Those struggling to attain this understanding, may well feel new sympathy for the
sentiments of Henry David Thoreau: "Our life is frittered away by detail.... Simplify,
simplify." Henry David Thoreau, Walden.
8. See Telecommuncations Act, see. 3, § 153(48), 110 Stat. at 60 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 153(48)).
9. In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, Part II, Order, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,476, 45,479 (1996) [hereinafter
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The most difficult piece in the deregulatory puzzle is how to create
competition for local telephone service. Telephone (in fact all telecommu-
nications) service is generally divided between local and long-distance
service. Current technology has created a peculiar reality where it is far
easier to carry information thousands of miles across the country than the
last mile into a recipient's business or home. It is the market for that last
mile, so to speak, which must be competitive for the 1996 Act to achieve
its far-reaching goals.
The geographical dividing line for a local telephone region is termed
a "Local Access and Transport Area," or "LATA"."° A company that
offers long distance service is said to be offering "InterLATA Service,"
meaning the communication is between points not within the same local
area.I
Following the break-up of AT&T in 1982, long-distance, or inter-
LATA, telephone service became a highly competitive market, with both
large and small players. 2 The local telephone market was initially divided
among seven Bell Operating Companies (BOCs),13 known colloquially as
"Baby Bells." But these "babies" were not only large, they continued to
enjoy virtually monopoly control over their area's local telephone service.
There were numerous much smaller local telephone companies, that had
monopolies over rural or much smaller geographic areas.
The expense of duplicating the local phone company's infrastructure,
and the necessity of interconnecting with its plant, also made it obvious that
competition for the local market would be impossible without the active
assistance of the very companies with whom competition was sought. The
question for lawmakers was how local telephone service, long considered
a "natural monopoly," 4 could be opened for competition.
Implementation Order, Part Ill.
10. Telecommunications Act, see. 3, § 153(43), 110 Stat. at 59 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 153(43)). A LATA is a contiguous region, encompassing no more than one
metropolitan statistical area. The area can be greater if permitted under the AT&T Consent
Decree or by the FCC. Id.
11. Id., sec. 3, § 153(42), 110 Stat at 59 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(42)).
12. The three largest companies, AT&T, Sprint, MCI, are joined by hundreds of smaller
long-distance companies. See generally Debra Kay Thomas Graves, The Consumer
Protection Myth in Long-Distance Telephone Regulation: Remediesfor the "Caveat Dialer"
Attitude. 27 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 383, 391 (1996).
13. Telecommunications Act, sec. 3, § 153(35), 110 Stat. at 58 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 153(35)).
14. "The incumbent LECs have economies of density, connectivity, and scale;
traditionally, these have been viewed as creating a natural monopoly." ImplementationOrder,
Part 1161 Fed. Reg. at 45,481. See generally Lawrence Sullivan, Elusive Goals Under the
TelecommunicationsAct, 25 Sw. U.L. REv. 487, 494-507 (1996).
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New Part II of Communications Act, entitled "Development of
Competitive Markets," creates the blueprint for what Congress hoped would
become the future of telecommunications. 5 Section 251 details the
substantive framework necessary for achieving competition in telecommu-
nications and section 252 describes the procedural mechanism for
implementing that framework. 6
A. The Duties of Competitors
Congress divided telecommunication carriers into four classifications
and varied the degree of regulation with each category. The broadest group
is the general telecommunications carrier, then comes the subgroup called
Local Exchange Carriers (LECs), which is further subdivided into
"incumbent" Local Exchange Carriers, and finally, the most detailed
regulatory provisions are for the BOCs.'7
A "telecommunications carrier" is defined as any entity offering, for
a fee to the public, to transmit information without changing the content of
that which is transmitted. 8 The primary duty imposed on all telecom-
munications carriers is interconnection. In other words, all telecommunica-
tion carriers must connect directly or indirectly with other carriers. 9
Additionally, carriers are prohibited from designing their networks so as to
thwart the ability of other carriers from interconnecting with them.2"
Far more detailed requirements are imposed on the LECs-those who
provide either telephone exchange service or service access. 2 Genuine
competition in local phone service was recognized as being very difficult
to acheive, yet was regarded as essential if there were to be true telecom-
munications competition. Despite the initial situation of general monopoly
LEC status, the 1996 Act described five obligations to be shouldered by all
future LECs, both dominant and challenger.
The first of these obligations involves resale.22 LECs are barred from
either prohibiting or imposing discriminatory or unreasonable conditions on
the resale of telecommunications services.
15. Telecommunications Act, sec. 101, 110 Stat. at 61.
16. Id. sec. 101, §§ 251-252, 110 Stat. at 61-70 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-
252).
17. Id secs. 101, § 251, sec. 151, § 271, 110 Stat. at 61-62, 86-92 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 251-271).
18. Id sec. 3, § 153(49)-(51), 110 Stat. at 60 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(49)-
(51)).
19. Id sec. 101, § 251(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 61 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(1)).
20. Id sec. 101, § 251(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 62 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(2)).
21. Id. sec. 3, § 153(44), 110 Stat. at 59 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(44)).
22. Id sec. 101, § 251(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 62 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(1)).
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Next, all LECs must provide "number portability."' This will permit
users to switch from one telecommunications carrier to another without
having to change their existing telecommunications numbers.24 The Act
recognizes the potential difficulty in implementing this mandate, so it
provides that number portability will be required only "to the extent
technically feasible," and in accordance with FCC requirements.'
Additionally, the Act states that the FCC must ensure that the costs of
establishing number portability are "borne by all telecommunications
carriers on a competitively neutral basis. 26
The third requirement for all LECs is that they provide dialing
parity." The term "dialing parity" is defined to mean that customers would
dial the same number of digits to use any available telecommunications
provider.28
Next, all LECs must provide their competitors with access to their
poles, conduits, and other rights-of-way.29 Congress first protected the
rights of cable operators to use telephone poles in the Pole Attachment Act
of 1978.3" Under the 1996 Act, access to poles will be even easier. In
addition to requiring LECs to share their poles, the Act requires utilities,3
such as gas and electric companies, to provide access on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis to cable operators and other telecommunications carriers.32
The final obligation imposed on all LECs is that they establish
"reciprocal compensation arrangements." '33 Such arrangements provide that
a network in which a call originates compensates the network in which that
23. Id. see. 3, § 251(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 62 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2)).
24. Id sec. 3, § 153(46), 110 Stat. at 60 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(46)).
25. Id. sec. 101, § 251(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 62 (to be codified at47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2)).
For the FCC's regulations, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 52.21-.3 1.
26. Id see. 101, § 251(e)(2), 110 Stat. at 64(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(2)).
27. Id sec. 101, § 251(3), 110 Stat. at 59 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(3)).
28. Id sec. 3, § 153(39), 110 Stat. at 59 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(39)). See
generally47 C.F.RL §§ 51.205-.215.
29. Id. sec. 101, § 251(b)(4), 110 Stat. at 62 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(4)).
30. Communications Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234,92 Stat. 33,35-36.
3 1. Telecommunications Act, see. 703, 110 Stat. at 149-50 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 224(a)(1)).
32. Id. see. 703, 110 Stat at 150. Such access may be denied if there is insufficient pole
capacity or problems with safety or reliability. Id. sec. 703, 110 Stat. at 150. By 1998, the
FCC must devise a means for resolving disputes over the rates charged for this pole
attachment, to be phased in over a five-year period. Id. sec. 703, 110 Stat. at 150. For now,
cable operators using the poles of others, can continue to rely on the rate formula used prior
to the 1996 Act. Id. sec. 703, 110 Stat. at 150. The new FCC regulations, when they do
become effective, will apply to all telecommunications carriers, except for cable television
systems providing only cable service. Id.
33. Id see. 101, § 251(b)(5), 110 stat. at 62 (to be codified at47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5)).
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call terminates. For simplicity and efficiency, the Act permits arrangements
such as the so-called "bill-and-keep" arrangement, whereby two networks
agree to waive their rights to recover from one another under this
section. 4
Congress was well aware that existing LECs would have an enormous
potential advantage over potential competitors in the local market.
Accordingly, several additional restrictions were placed on "incumbent"
LECs, those either providing telephone exchange service on the enactment
date of the Act (February 8, 1996) or those newcomers determined by the
FCC to have obtained a market position comparable to that of an incum-
bent.35
In addition to the requirements imposed on all LECs, incumbent LECs
must provide interconnection for other telecommunication carriers at "any
technically feasible point" in the incumbent's network. 6 This means that
interconnection must be provided for all competitors who wish to provide
local telephone exchange service and exchange access. There is no similar
requirement that an incumbent LEC permit interconnection by a cable
television operator or other sort of information service, except to the extent
that they are providers of telecommunications service. All interconnection
under this provision must be, at least, of the same quality as that available
for either the incumbent LEC itself or its affiliates, and must be made
available at reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates and terms.
Incumbent LECs are also required to make available to competing
telecommunications carriers "unbundled access" to "network elements."'
A "network element" is defined to include not only the physical equipment
used to provide telecommunications service, but also significant functions,
systems, and information that are made available by, or are used in the
34. Id sec. 101, § 252(d)(2)(B)(i), 110 Stat. at 68 (to be codified as 47 U.S.C
§ 252(d)(2)(B)(i)).
35. Id see. 101, § 251(h), 110 Stat. at 65 (to be codified as 47 U.S.C. § 251(h)). As the
FCC stated, "The rules we adopt ... will benefit consumers by making some of the
strongest aspects of local exchange carrier incumbency-the local dialing, telephone
numbers, operator services, directory assistance, and directory listing-available to all
competitors on an equal basis." In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Part III, SecondReport and Order, 61 Fed. Reg.
47,284, 47,287 (1996).
36. Telecommunications Act, sec. 101, § 251(c)(2), 110 stat. at 62 (to be codified as 47
U.S.C. § 25 1(c)(2)). Accordingto the FCC, theterm "interconnection" inthis section"refers
only to the physical linking of two networks for the mutual exchange of traffic."
ImplementationOrder, PartII, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,476,45,500. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.305 for the
FCC's regulations on interconnection.
37. Id sec. 101, § 251(c)(3), 110 Stat. at 62-63 (to be codified as 47 U.S.C.
§ 251(c)(3)). See 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.307-.321 for the relevant FCC regulations.
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transmission of, telecommunications service. 8 These would include local
loops and sub-loops, switching, and signaling functions. "Unbundled access"
means the availability of access to distinct parts of the incumbent's network,
at an appropriately lower cost than access to all of the elements of the
network. Thus, a competitor can purchase only those network components
and functions that it needs to offer service. That competitor is then free to
combine these unbundled elements in the manner its deems best for
providing service.
In order to make interconnection and unbundled access economically
feasible, incumbent LECs are required to permit physical collocation of
their competitors' equipment. 9 In other words, incumbent LECs must
allow other telecommunication carriers to place their equipment at the site
of the incumbent's own switching center. Again, rates charged for using
these premises must be reasonable and nondiscriminatory.
A different type of competition is made possible by the requirement
that the incumbent LEC sell to other carriers, at wholesale rates, the same
telecommunication service it provides to retail customers.4" The availabili-
ty of wholesale pricing will enable the other carriers to offer for sale the
same service to the incumbent's customers.4'
The most contentious part of this issue is the determination of
wholesale rates. If the wholesale rates are too close to retail rates, it will
discourage competition in the local market.42 On the other hand, if
wholesale rates are too low, it may discourage the construction of facilities-
based competition.43
The 1996 Act states that "wholesale" rates are to be calculated by
38. Id. sec. 3, § 153(45), 110 Stat. at 59-60 (to be codified as 47 U.S.C. 153(45)).
39. Id. sec. 101, § 251(c)(6), 110 Stat. at 63 (to be codified as 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6)).
Ifphysical collocation is either technically impractical or impossibledueto space limitations,
the Act permits a state regulatory commission to authorize "virtual collocation" instead. Id
See generally47 C.F.R. § 51.323 (1996).
40. Telecommunications Act, see. 101, § 251(c)(4)(A), 110 Stat. at 63 (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(A)).
41. In keeping with this particular provision's goal of creating direct competition, only
one limitation is placed on the resale of telecommunications service: where a service has not
been made universally available by the incumbent, but has only been available to a particular
category of subscribers, a State commission can prohibit the resale of that service to a
different category ofsubscribers.Id sec. 101, § 251(c)(4)(B), 110 Stat. at 63 (to be codified
as 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(B)).
42. See generally Implementation Order, Part I1, supra note 9, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,475,
45,563-67. The FCC stated that resale is an "important entry strategy for many new entrants,
especially in the short term when they are building their own facilities," and also for "small
businesses that may lack capital to compete in the local exchange market ... by building
their own networks." Id. at 45,564.
43. Id. at 45,565.
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subtracting from retail subscriber rates any "costs that will be avoided by
the local exchange carrier."' Arithmetically, wholesale rates equal retail
rates minus costs avoided. Even though the 1996 Act says that each "State
commission" should determine the wholesale rates,45 the FCC has adopted
a "minimum set of criteria for [the] avoided cost studies" that will be
conducted by the states.46
Most notably, the FCC ruled that the "avoided costs" are not to be
limited to only the costs that an incumbent LEC will actually avoid by
selling wholesale rather than directly to subscribers 7 If that were the case,
the incumbent would have an incentive to keep its expenditures high, so
that its competitors would pay a higher resale price. The FCC, instead, ruled
that "avoided costs" means all of the costs "that an incumbent LEC would
no longer incur if it were to cease retail operations and instead provide all
of its services through resellers," '4 whether these savings were actually
realized or not.
The FCC also decreed a default wholesale rate, one that is to be used
by State commissions who either have not yet conducted an "avoided retail
cost study" or choose not to undertake such a study.49 In either case, the
FCC decreed that interim wholesale rates must be set at between 17 percent
and 25 percent below the incumbent LECs retail rates.5
B. The Special Case of BOCs
The strongest monopolists in the telecommunications universe are the
Bell Operating Companies, the BOCs, who spun off from AT&T and carved
up the local telephone market. If a competitive telecommunications system
is to evolve, the BOCs must face direct competition for local service. The
BOCs, meanwhile, have long been champing at the bit to enter the long
distance market.
In a sense the most important piece of legislative strategy in the 1996
Act was the provision that the BOCs are to be given permission to offer
long distance service to their local customers only upon fulfilling a
44. Telecommunications Act, sec. 101, § 252(d)(3), 110 stat. at 68 (to be codified as 47
U.S.C. § 252(d)(3)).
45. Id.
46. Implementation Order, Part I, 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,565.
47. Id.
48. Id. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.609 (1996). This avoided cost includes both the direct costs
of providing retail service and a pro rata share of indirect costs, meaning costs like general
corporate operating expenses that are shared between retail and wholesale operations. 47
C.F.R. § 51.609(c) (1996).
49. Implementation Order, Part II, 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,565.
50. 47 C.F.R. § 51.611(b) (1996).
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"competitive checklist" that ensures or permits competition for local service.
Because of the lack of a similar danger of unfair competition, BOCs are
free to offer long-distance service to those not within their local service
areas immediately." For a BOC to be given FCC permission to offer long-
distance service to its own local clientele, though, there must be either: 1)
an agreement with an existing competitor for that BOCs local service or, 2)
if no competitor has come forward, a statement indicating that the BOC is
ready to provide access and interconnection for potential competitors.
Before the FCC will consider a BOCs request to provide long distance
service to its local customers, the state commission with jurisdiction over
that locality must give its approval to the agreement of statement.
1. The Competitive Checklist
The "competitive checklist" for BOCs wanting to offer long distance
service includes many of the provisions required under the provisions
governing general incumbent Local Exchange Companies. 2 The Act,
however, adds several requirements that are specific to telephone service.
To gain permission to enter the long distance market, a BOC must offer
"access and interconnection" to others who wish to compete for the local
market. "Access and interconnection", is defined to include all of the
following:
From the incumbent LEC checklist
1. Interconnection for other carriers offering intraLATA service at "any
technically feasible point" in the BOC's network
2. Unbundled access to network elements
From the general LEC checklist
3. Access to BOC poles, conduits, and other rights-of-way.
4. Number portability
5. Dialing parity
6. Reciprocal compensation arrangements
7. Availability for resale
Specific for BOCs Checklist
8. Local loop transmission (from the central office to customer's premises)
9. Local transport
10. Local switching
51. Telecommunications Act, see. 151, § 271(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 86. Someservices, such
as "800" services which terminate inside a BOC's local area and permit subscribersto choose
their long distance carriers, are considered in-region services subject to the competitive
checklist requirement. Id see. 151, § 27 10), 110 Stat. at 92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 2710)).
52. See supra Part IH.A.
[Vol. 49
IDEAS OF THE MARKETPLACE
11. Nondiscriminatory access to emergency (911 and E911), directory
assistance, and operator call-completion services
12. White page directory listing for competitors' customers
13. Nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers
14. Nondiscriminatory access to data bases and signalling necessary for call
routing and completion.
2. Facilities-based Competitors for the Local Market
The above checklist encompasses the minimum requirements to be
contained in agreements with competitors for the local telephone market. In
order to ensure that a powerful, independent competitor exists for local
service prior to a BOC's entry into the long distance market, the Act
requires that any competitor be "facilities-based." " The term "facilities-
based" means that the competitor is providing local service either exclusive-
ly or predominantly over its own facilities. It excludes a competitor who is
merely reselling the BOC's telephone exchange service. 4 The prime
example given by Congress of an effective "two-wire" policy is the
provision of competitive local telephone service through the facilities of a
local cable television system.55
Moreover, to ensure that local competition is in place, the competitor
must be operational, not merely in the planning stage. 6 This will also
make it easier to ensure that the full checklist is in place.
3. The Absence of Local Competitors
It is, of course, possible that no one will want to take on a particular
BOC on its home court. The drafters of the 1996 Act did not want to deny
a BOC under those circumstances all opportunity to offer long-distance
service to its local customers. Accordingly, the Act provides that a BOC
who has not received a request for interconnection may still apply for
permission to provide such long-distance service. Instead of an agreement,
the BOC must file a statement of the terms and conditions under which it
is ready and willing to offer the components of the competitive checklist.
It was also foreseeable that, if a signed agreement was a necessary
prerequisite for BOC entry into the long-distance market, some player in
53. Telecommunications Act, sec. 151, § 271(c)(1)(A), 110 Stat. at 87 (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(A)). According to the Conference Report, this requirement is to
ensure, "that an unaffiliated competing provider is in the market." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-
458, at 148.
54. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 148.
55. Id
56. Id
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that market might try to delay BOC entry by engaging in bad faith
negotiation or otherwise acting improperly. To prevent such subterfuge, the
statement described above will also suffice if the only providers to request
access have failed to negotiate in good faith.57
4. Separate Affiliates
Even with the competitive checklist in place, Congress feared that a
BOC could use its local power to leverage an unfair advantage over
competitive markets. As an additional safeguard, the 1996 Act requires that
a BOC create a separate affiliate if it wanted to offer certain services.
First, a BOC must use a separate affiliate to offer its local customers
long-distance service." These services include all long-distance telephone,
telecommunications, or information services, other than "incidental"
services,59 and services that had been authorized prior to the 1996 Act.6 °
Second, a separate affiliate is needed for BOCs engaged in manufac-
turing activities. 6  The term "manufacturing" includes all the activities
previously covered by that term in the AT&T Consent Decree.62 A BOC
cannot discriminate in favor of its own affiliate in the procurement of
manufacturing equipment.63
The separate affiliate must operate independently from its BOC
parent.6 It must keep separate books and records and must have separate
officers, directors and employees. Further, all transactions with the BOC
must be "on an arm's length basis." 65
57. Telecommunications Act, see. 151, § 271(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 87 (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(B)). The statement will also suffice if the only providers to request
access have failed to comply, in a timely fashion, with the implementation schedule of an
interconnection agreement. Id.
58. Id. sec. 151, § 272(a)(2)(B), 110 Stat. at 92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 272(a)(2)(B)).
59. Id. sec. 151, § 272(a)(2)(B)(i), I10 Stat. at 92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272
(a)(2)(B)(i)). "Incidental services" are defined to include such services as: alarm monitoring
services, audio and video programming and the capability of interaction for subscriber
selection of such programming, commercial mobile services, and signaling information used
in connection with telephone exchange services. Id. sec. 151, § 271(g), 110 Stat. at 91 (to
be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271(g)).
60. Id. sec. 151, § 272(a)(2)(B)(iii), 110 Stat. at 92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 272(a)(2)(B)(iii)).
61. Id. see. 151, § 272(a)(2)(A), 110 Stat. at 92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 272(a)(2)(A)).
62. Id. sec. 151, § 273(h), 110 Stat. at 100 (to be codified at47 U.S.C. § 273(h)). This
section states that the definition of "manufacturing" is to be the same as in the AT&T
Consent Decree.
63. Id. see. 151, § 273(e)(1), 110 Stat. at 99 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 273 (e)(l)).
64. Id. sec. 151, § 272(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(1)).
65. Id. see. 151, § 272(b)(5), 110 Stat. at 93 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(5)).
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With the hope that true competition against BOC's will flourish
quickly, the 1996 Act provides for a sunsetting of the separate affiliate
requirements. Three years after a BOC is authorized to offer long-distance
services, it will no longer need to either offer long-distance telecommuni-
cations services or conduct manufacturing activities through a separate
affiliate.6 Using a different starting point, the Act similarly states that four
years after the date of the 1996 Act (February 8, 2000), a separate affiliate
will not be needed for the provision of long-distance information ser-
vices. 7 The timing of either of the sunset provisions can be extended by
the FCC if the risk of anticompetitive abuse remains.68
C. Obtaining an Interconnection Agreement
Most of the issues surrounding interconnection will be resolved, to a
large extent, on a case-by-case basis. The final rates, terms, and conditions
governing a particular interconnection must reflect the legitimate needs of
all parties. Thus, competitors must reach agreement on a host of sensitive
issues. There are obvious problems involved in reaching a mutually
beneficial agreement between business adversaries, especially where one
party, in effect, holds all the cards. 69 The 1996 Act creates a multi-layered
scheme, whereby interconnecting agreements are reached either through
negotiation or binding arbitration, and then subject to review by the local
state commission.
It will be most cost-efficient if parties resolve their differences through
voluntary negotiations.70 Both sides have the duty to negotiate "in good
faith."' This provision requires more cooperation than the analogous
66. Id. sec. 151, § 272(f)(1), 110 Stat. at 94 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(0(1)).
67. Id. see. 151, § 272(f)(2), 110 Stat. at 94 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(0(2)).
68. Id. sec. 151, § 272(f)(1)-(2), 110 Stat. at 94 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 272(f)(1)-
(2)).
69. "As distinct from bilateral commercial negotiation, the new entrant comes to the
table with little or nothing the incumbent LEC needs or wants." Implementation Order, Part
II, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,475, 45,481. As one commentator noted, "I would compare it to going
to the Department of Motor Vehicles and trying to negotiate more favorable terms there. It
is very hard to negotiate with somebody who has 100 percent of the market, and a very
strong desire to keep that situation in place." See PANEL III: Implications of the New
Telecommunications Legislation, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 517, 534
(1996) (statement of J.Richard Devlin, Executive Vice President, Sprint Corporation).
70. Telecommunications Act, see. 101, § 252(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 66 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 252(a)(1)).
71. Id. see. 101, § 251(c)(1), 110 Stat. at 62 (to be codified at47 U.S.C § 251 (c)(l)).
Although this requirement is contained in the subsection entitled "Additional Obligations of
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers," the section explicitly places the duty to negotiate in
good faith on both the incumbent and "[the requesting telecommunications carrier." Id. See
also 47 C.F.R. § 51.301(a)-(b) (1996) (Duty to Negotiate).
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requirement under federal labor law. While unions and management are
required to "confer in good faith," that duty is specifically restricted so as
not to "compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of
a concession."72 There is no similar restriction in the 1996 Act. Although
the Act is not more specific, the very purpose of the Act, to "accelerate
rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and
information technologies.., by opening all telecommunications markets to
competition ... ," implies a more cooperative mindset. While reaching
an agreement is not required, it would violate the 1996 Act if a party
"negotiates without serious intent to contract."74
If voluntary agreement is not reached, either side can petition the state
commission to conduct binding arbitration.75 In setting rates for intercon-
nection or access to unbundled network elements, the state commission is
not to use the traditional rate-of-return formula. Instead, the rates are to be
based on actual cost, including a reasonable profit, and must be nondiscrim-
inatory.76 Similarly, rates charged for reciprocal compensation (for
transport and termination of calls originating on a competitor's network)
must either reflect the actual costs associated with the transport and
termination of calls, or be supplanted by a "bill-and-keep" arrangement.77
The 1996 Act requires that all interconnect agreements, whether
obtained through voluntary negotiations or binding arbitration, must be
submitted to the state commission for approval.78 It is not entirely clear
why an agreement that was created through arbitration by a state commis-
sion should need to be submitted to the same commission for approval, but
72. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1971).
73. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 113.
74. Robert Summers, 'Good Faith' in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 221 (1968). See generallyE. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CoNTrAcrs 187-190 (1982).
75. Telecommunications Act, see. 101, § 252(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 66 (to be codified at47
U.S.C. § 252(b)(1)). The demand for arbitration must be filed within a relatively short
window: between the 135th and 160th day (inclusive) after the incumbent has received a
request for negotiation. Id The state commission must reach its arbitration decision within
nine months from the date of that request for negotiation. Id see. 101, § 252(b)(4)(c), 110
Stat. at 67 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(b)(4)(c)).
76. Id sec. 101, § 252(d)(1), 110 Stat. at 67 (to be codified at47 U.S.C. § 252 (d)(1)).
77. Id. sec. 101, § 252(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 68 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2)).
The bill-and-keep arrangement provides that each network will waive its recovery rights in
exchange for the other network's agreement to do the same. See supra text accompanying
note 34.
78. Id. sec. 101, § 252(e)(4), 110 Stat. at 69 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)). If
the state commission does not act within 90 days of submission of a negotiated agreement,
or 30 days of an arbitrated agreement, the agreement will be deemed approved.
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so be it.79 Negotiated agreements must be approved unless the agreement
is found to either discriminate against a carrier not party to the agreement
or be otherwise against the public interest.o Arbitrated agreements are to
be approved unless they conflict with the provisions of sections 251 or
252.81
There are only two permissible ways to attack the decision, action, or
inaction of a state commission in this area. First, an aggrieved party can
petition the FCC to preempt the state commission and take over the
proceedings.8 2 Second, a complaint can be filed in federal court to
determine whether an agreement complies with the Act.83 State courts are
denied jurisdiction in this matter.
States are frther limited by section 253, which prempts any local law
or regulation which creates a barrier to entry into the telecommunications
market.84 The local government is not entirely out of the regulatory picture
though. The drafters of the 1996 Act intended that state and local
governments would retain their ability to "manage the public rights-of-way"
in a non-discriminatory, competitively-neutral way, and charge "fair and
reasonable" fees for use of those rights-of-way.5
This savings clause is likely to be the source of much litigation. Not
only is the Act silent as to what makes a fee "reasonable," there is also the
79. While the arbitration procedure, designed to reach a mediated agreement, serves a
different purpose from the approval procedure, which is designed to ensure that the
substance of the agreement squares with the procompetitive sections of the Act, it would
have no doubt been simpler to require the state commission, as arbitrator, to ensure that the
final agreement be consistent with the Act.
80. Telecommunications Act, sec. 101, § 252(e)(2)(A), 110 Stat. at 68 (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(2)(A)).
81. Id. see. 101, § 252(e)(2)(B), 110 Stat. at 68 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 252(e)(2)(B)).
82. Id. see. 101, § 252(e)(5), 110 Stat. at 69 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5)).
83. Id. see. 101, §252(e)(6), 110 Stat. at 69 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. 252(e)(6)).
84. Id. see. 101, § 253(a), 110 Stat. at 70 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(a)). State
and local governments are also prohibited from regulating Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS)
service, id. see. 205, § 303(v), 110 Stat. at 114 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303(v)), and
the FCC must regulate to prevent local zoning or other regulation that impairs a viewer's
ability to receive DBS or MMDS service. Id. see. 207, 110 Stat. at 114. The new federal
regulations bar restrictions not only by zoning and building laws, but by private covenants
and homeowner's associations, unless narrowly tailored to protect interests in safety or
historic preservation. 47 C.F.RL § A000 (1996).
85. Id. see. 101, § 253(c) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(c)). See also H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 104-485, at 180 (stating that even though franchising authorities cannot regulate
cable television operators in their provision of telecommunications services, local
governments retain their authority over rights-of-way and can charge reasonable fees for
their use).
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question as to whether cable operators, who already pay a franchise fee,86
can be required to pay a second time for the same wire, just because it is
carrying telecommunications information as well as video programming.
Moreover, local regulators contend that the power to "manage" rights-of-
way encompasses the power to condition use by telecommunications carriers
on a variety of regulatory obligations, while those carriers argue that
management of rights-of-way is limited to safety-type concerns and does
not include the manner in which the carrier provides service.
While neither the 1996 Act nor the Conference Report define manage,
the restricted interpretation is probably more consistent with the intent of
Congress. First, the section is entitled, "Removal of Barriers to Entry."87
Additionally, the Act specifically permits local governments to protect other
important interests, such as the rights of consumers and the promotion of
universal service.8 Such specific permission would not have been needed
had the authority to manage rights-of-way been all-inclusive. The FCC is
charged with preempting any local government which oversteps its
management powers and creates an impermissible barrier to telecommunica-
tion service. 9
D. Universal Service
The concept of universal service is one of the most important links
between the old regulatory scheme and the 1996 Act. From the very
beginnings of the FCC, universal service has been at the center of
telecommunications policy." The 1934 Communications Act, for example,
mandated that the FCC regulate electronic communications "so as to make
available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges .... ,91
The 1996 Act represents an attempt to fulfill the commitment to
universal service while adapting to ongoing changes in both technology and
the marketplace.9" The 1996 Act includes within its list of universal
service principles: that rates be "just, reasonable and affordable"; that access
86. See 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1994).
87. Telecommunications Act, see. 101, § 253, 110 Stat. at 70-71 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 253).
88. Id see. 101, § 253(b), 110 Stat. at 70 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(b)).
89. Id see. 101, § 253(d), 110 Stat. at 70-71 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(d)).
90. Though as the FCC correctly points out, the costs ofuniversal service are sometimes
hidden from view: "The current universal service system is a patchwork quilt of implicit and
explicit subsidies." Implementation Order, Part 11, 61 Fed Reg. 45,480.
91. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)).
92. See generallyH.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 130-34 (1996).
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to "advanced telecommunications and information services" be provided to
consumers living in rural, low-income, or high-cost areas; and that all
providers of telecommunications services make an "equitable and nondis-
criminatory contribution" to universal service.
There are, of course, two preliminary questions for any universal
service policy: what "services" must be provided, and how "universal" must
their provision be? Most importantly, the 1996 Act recognizes that the
services, which as a matter of national policy, should be available to all
Americans, can no longer be a static concept. Thus, the Act decrees that
universal service "is an evolving level of telecommunications services.
... "' The FCC's definition of universal service is to be established
"periodically" based on which services have become: essential to education,
health or safety; deployed and subscribed to by a "substantial majority" of
residential customers; and otherwise consistent with the public interest.95
The actual mechanism for ensuring universal service is to be decided
by the FCC. All telecommunications carriers that provide interstate service
must contribute to this mechanism, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory
basis.96 These contributions will then go to an "eligible telecommunica-
tions carriers" 97---those carriers that offer and advertise the components of
universal service throughout a designated service area.98 Both the scope of
the designated area and a carrier's status as eligible are determined by each
state's commission.99 In nonrural areas, the state commissions must
designate more than one carrier as eligible if multiple carriers request the
designation and meet the statutory requirements.'
In addition to receiving monetary contributions, an eligible carrier also
has the right to demand that incumbent LEC's share their infrastructure in
order to receive the benefits of the incumbent's economies of scale and
93. Id sec. 101, § 254(b), 110 Stat. at 71-72 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)).
94. Id. sec. 101, § 254(c), 110 Stat. at 72 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)).
95. Id sec. 101, § 254(a)-(d), 110 Stat. at 71-73 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 254(c)(1)(A).(D)). TheFCC's actionisprecededbytherecommendationofaFederal-State
Joint Board. Id sec. 101, § 254(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 71 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 254(a)(1)).
96. Id see. 101, § 254(d), 110 Stat. at 73 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(d)).
97. Id sec. 101, § 254(e), 110 Stat. at 73 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(e)).
98. Id sec. 102, § 214(e)(1), 110 Stat. at 80 (to be codified at47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(i)).
99. Id sec. 102, § 214(e)(2),(5), 110 Stat. 80 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2),
(5)).
100. Id see. 102, § 214(e)(2), 110 Stat. 80 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(2)). For
rural areas, the decision whether to designate more than one carrier as eligible is left to the
discretion of the state commission. Id
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scope.'"' The incumbent must make infrastructure, technology, informa-
tion and facilities or functions available on 'just and reasonable terms" for
the purpose of providing universal service. °2
Eligible carriers may only use universal service support for the
provision, maintenance, and upgrading of facilities and services related to
the provision of universal service. 3 This is consistent with the general
requirement that carriers cannot use noncompetitive services to subsidize
services subject to competition. 4 For interstate services, the FCC must
establish whatever cost allocation rules and accounting safeguards are
necessary to ensure that universal services bear no more than a reasonable
share of the costs of the facilities providing all services." 5 The states have
the same responsibility for intrastate services. 6
III. CABLE TELEVISION AND VIDEO PROGRAMMING
Like the BOCs, cable operators enjoyed a virtual monopoly in their
service areas prior to the 1996 Act. True, there was the legal right under the
1992 Cable Television Act for competitors to obtain franchises to lay a
second cable in an area.10 7 Also, competition of a limited kind was being
offered by the newer video distribution systems, such as Direct Broadcast
Satellites (DBS) and Multi-channel Multipoint Distribution Services
(MMDS). Nonetheless, cable television still had many of the earmarks, and
much of the power, of a traditional monopoly. 8
Cable television faced a dizzying array of changing regulatory
environments in the twelve years prior to the 1996 Act. In 1984, cable
operators received a large amount of freedom, for the first time, from rate
101. Id. sec. 101, § 259(a),(b)(4), 110 Stat. at 77-78 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 259(a),(b)(4)). If an eligible carrier enjoys its own economies of scale and scope, there is
no right under this provision to share infrastructure. Id sec. 101, § 259(d), 110 Stat. at 78
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 259(d)).
102. Id see. 101, § 259(b)(4), 110 Stat. at 78 (to be codified at47 U.S.C. § 259(b)(4)).
103. Id sec. 101, § 254(e), 110 Stat. at 73 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(e)).
104. Id. sec. 101, § 254(k), 110 Stat. at 75 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(k)).
105. Id
106. Id
107. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994). See also Preferred Comm., Inc. v. City of L.A., 754 F.2d
1396 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding exclusive cable franchises unconstitutional), aff'd on other
grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
108. "Limited non-cable competition exists today from several non-cable technologies,
such as DBS, MMDS, and SMATV. Since the total penetration of such alternative providers
today accounts for less than 10 percent of the country's multichannel video offerings
however, the competition is a long way from being effective in most areas of the country."
Botein, supra note 5, at 596-97.
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and other forms of regulation. °9 With consumers angry about skyrocket-
ing rates and broadcasters anxious to ensure that their programming would
be carried on cable systems, Congress overrode a Presidential veto and
tightened the regulatory reins in 1992. n °
The 1996 Act represents a different balancing act. Cable television is
to be partly deregulated so it can compete in the broader telecommuni-
cations market. Full deregulation, however, is avoided, because of the
likelihood of continuing (at least for the immediate future) market
dominance in the local video arena. Meanwhile, provisions are made to lift,
once and for all, the legal barriers both to telephone company provision of
cable and other video programming, and cable entry into the local telephone
market.
A. Effective Competition
The provisions involving the definition of "effective competition" are
important for many reasons. "Effective competition" is a label desired by
cable operators seeking rate deregulation as well as the ultimate goal of the
drafters of the 1996 Act.
Under the 1992 Cable Act, the term "effective competition" was
limited and rarely found. These standards continue after the 1996 Act, but
an additional means to determine "effective competition" was added.
Under the 1992 Cable Act, cable systems with very low penetration
rates, under 30 percent of franchise-area households subscribing, are
deemed to face effective competition."' The vast majority of cable
operators, those with higher penetration, need to prove that they face direct
head-to-head competition from a multichannel programmer (such as another
cable operator, MMDS system, or DBS operator).1 To qualify though,
that competitor needs to offer service to at least half of the cable operator's
franchise area and provide service to at least 15 percent of the area's
households." 3 The last way the 1992 Cable Act provided for a declaration
of "effective competition" was if the local government itself offered a
109. See 1984 Cable Act. This was not, by any means, a law which deregulated cable.
See generally Michael I. Meyerson, The 1984 Cable Communications Policy Act. A
Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REV. 543 (1985).
110. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
I1. 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(A) (1994).
112. 47 U.S.C. § 543(/)(1)(C) (1994).
113. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 301, 110 Stat. 56, 115
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(B)). See also Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P.
v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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comparable service to at least half of the franchise area's households. 14
The 1996 Act adds a fourth way for a cable operator to claim
"effective competition," and thus obtain rate deregulation. If a telephone
company (a "local exchange carrier" in the Act's parlance), offers
comparable video programming, either directly or through an affiliate, the
cable operator will be deemed to face effective competition." 5 Included
in this definition are telephone companies who offer video service through
any means, including MMDS as well as a wire, other than direct-to-home
satellite, in an unaffiliated cable operator's service area. Unlike the 1992
Cable Act's provisions regarding other private multi-channel competitors,
the telephone company need not serve any particular number of video
subscribers. Instead, the telephone company must simply "offer" service:
that is be physically able to provide video programming service with only
a minimal additional investment."6
B. Rate Deregulation
The battle over the extent to which cable rates should be regulated has
always been the emotional highlight of debates over cable regulation in
general." 7 The 1996 Act provides greater deregulation immediately, with
the promise of far greater pricing freedom for cable operators in the years
to come.
The 1996 Act continues the distinction, created in the 1992 Cable Act,
between "basic" service and "cable programming service."". The "basic"
tier of cable programming contains broadcast channels and channels
offering Public, Educational, and Government (PEG) Access programming.
"Cable programming service" includes all other tiers of cable programming
excepting programming offered on a per-channel or per-programming (such
as pay-per-view) basis.
The basic tier is subject to local regulation, but that local regulation
114. Telecommunications Act, see. 301, 110 Stat. at 115 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 543(1)(1)(C)).
115. Id. sec. 301, 110 Stat. at 115 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(/1)(D)).
*'Comparable" programming means at least 12 channels of programming, at least some of
which are television broadcast channels. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 170 (1996).
116. 47 C.F.R. § 76.905(e). Additionally, potential subscribers mustbereasonably aware
that the telephone company's service is available. Id
117. The 1992 Cable Act, in fact. begins with the finding that cable rates were rising
three times faster than the rate of inflation since the 1984 Act. See 1992 Cable Act, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, § 2(a)(1), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460.
118. See Telecommunications Act, see. 301, 110 Stat. at 115 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 543(b)(7)(A), (b(2)).
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must follow strict FCC guidelines. 9 The FCC's guidelines are extraordi-
narily complicated, even for the telecommunications field, with the
Commission's implementation order totaling more than 500 pages. 2 0
Ironically, all the legal and mathematical factors represent nothing more
than an attempt to define which basic rates are "reasonable."''
Cable operators facing effective competition are not subject to
regulation of the basic tier. Additionally, small cable operators who only
offered basic service as of the end of 1994 are similarly free of basic
service rate regulation.
22
For cable operators, the most important change brought by the 1996
Act is that the other tiers of cable programming, those providing "cable
programming service," will be free from rate regulation after March 31,
1999."z On the belief that there will be true competition for delivering
"cable-type" programming to consumers after April 1, 1999, governmental
rate regulation of cable programming service will be no more. Such rate
regulation is, of course, already ended for those operators facing "effective
competition," but this deregulation will cover the entire cable industry.
Until March 31, 1999, for cable operators not facing effective
competition, rates for these tiers, as with the basic tier, are required to be
"reasonable." The primary difference is that the setting of these rates is
done by the FCC, not the local franchising authorities.'
While the rate relief reflects a belief in the impending arrival of
competition, the 1996 Act did not relieve cable operators of many other
rules that were designed to protect the video marketplace. For example, the
1992 Cable Act contained strong program access requirements.'"
Programmers who are vertically integrated with cable operators must sell
their programs to competing distribution services at reasonable and
119. Id sec. 301, 110 Stat. 56, 116 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543).
120. Rate Regulation, Report and Order, 8 F.C.C. Rcd. 5631, 72 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
733 (1993).
121. Telecommunications Act, sec. 301, 110 Stat. at 116 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 543(b)(1)).
122. Id see. 301, 110 Stat. at 116 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(m)(2)). A "small"
cable operator means one who is not affiliated with either any company serving more than
I percent of the nation's subscribers or any business with gross annual revenue greater than
250 million dollars. See id.
123. Id sec. 301, 110 Stat. at 115 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(c)(4)).
124. Id sec. 301, 110 Stat. at 116 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(c)). It will be harder
to file a complaint concerning rate increases under the 1996 Act. In a change from the 1992
Cable Act, only complaints from franchising authorities, rather than by individual subscrib-
ers, will trigger FCC investigation. Id
125. Id sec. 301, 110 Stat. at 117 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 548). The constitution-
ality of this requirement was upheld in Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835
F.Supp. I (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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nondiscriminatory prices. 2 6 The requirement was not lessened by the
1996 Act. 27 Similarly, the must-carry rules, which require cable operators
to carry local broadcast channels, remain substantially unchanged by the
1996 Act. 28
C. Ownership of Cable Systems and Other Video Providers
Other than rates, the other area where the 1996 Act promises to create
major changes in the cable industry involves the loosening of the rules
involving cable ownership. Cable television operators are free to enter into
the larger telecommunications market, but may face stiff competition on
their home turf from local telephone companies.
1. Telco Provision of Video Programming
Ending a lengthy legal battle, the 1996 Act eliminated the ban on
cable-telephone cross-ownership. Previously, cable television operators and
local telephone companies were barred from entering the other's field in the
same location.'29 A string of lower federal courts had struck down the
cross-ownership ban as violative of the First Amendment, and the Supreme
Court had agreed to hear the issue. 3° Before the Court could rule howev-
er, the 1996 Act's removal of the ban was enacted,' and the Court
dismissed the challenge as moot.'32
Under the 1996 Act, there are four ways a local phone company can
126. Telecommunications Act, sec. 301, 110 Stat. at 117 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§548(c)).
127. In fact, the provision was extended to telephone companies providing video
programming. Id. sec. 302, 110 Stat. at 121 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1)(a)). See
note 137 and accompanying text, infra.
128. Telecommunications Act, see. 301(d)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 116 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 534-535). The only changes made to the must-carry rules were minor: The FCC
was permitted to use a variety of measures to determine the market for broadcasters, section
534(h)(l)(C), and the FCC was forced to rule on petitions to modify a television market
within 120 days of a request. See id.
129. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b), now repealed. There were a few small exceptions, such as for
cross-ownership in rural areas. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.56(a), now repealed.
130. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D.
Va. 1993), af'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated, 116 S.Ct. 1036 (1996); U.S. West,
Inc. v. United States, 855 F.Supp. 1184 (Wash. 1994), aff'd, 48 F.3d 1092, (9th Cir. 1994),
vacated, 116 S.Ct. 1037 (1996); Pacific Telesis Group v. United States, 48 F.3d 1106 (9th
Cir. 1994), vacatedsub nom. U.S. West, Inc. v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1037 (1996).
131. Telecommunications Act, sec. 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 122 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 521).
132. See, e.g., Chesapeake& Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1036 (1996),
vacating42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994); U.S. West, Inc. v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1037
(1996), vacating48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994); Pacific Telesis Group v. United States, 48
F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1994).
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offer video programming in its local area. A telephone company can
provide video either as a pure common carrier or a traditional cable
operator. 33 As a video common carrier, the telephone company is treated
as a classic common carrier, subject to the common carrier provisions of
Title II of the Communications Act of 1934. As a traditional cable operator,
the telephone company would be subject to all of the requirements of the
1984 and 1992 Cable Acts.
A third possibility for video distribution is through radio-based
communication. 34 If a telephone company provides a wireless, radio-
based multichannel video programming distribution service, it will not meet
Cable Act restrictions.
The most innovative part of the 1996 Act in this area was the creation
of a fourth way for telephone company delivery of video programming: the
"open video system.' ' 35 An open video system is a hybrid, of sorts. It
permits some programming control for the telephone company, but reserves
other channels for use by nonaffiliated programmers. The drafters of the
1996 Act hoped that the open video system would become the predominant
model for telephone entry into the video marketplacee 36
Specifically, the local telephone company can only select the
programming for one-third of the open video system's channel capacity, if
demand for channels exceeds the system's supply. The other two-thirds of
the system must be made available to nonaffiliated program providers. The
1996 Act, however, places no upper limit on the number of channels a
telephone company or its affiliate can program. This provides an incentive
for the creation of open video systems with large channel capacity.
As with so much of the 1996 Act, regulation of open video systems
contain significant antidiscrimination provisions. Most broadly, the operators
of an open video system may not discriminate in regards to carriage of
programming, and rates and other conditions of carriage must be just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.'37 Moreover, operators of an open
133. Telecommunications Act, sec. 302(b)(1), § 651, 110 Stat. 56, 118-19 (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 651(a)(2),(3)).
134. Id see. 302, § 651, 110 Stat. at 118 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 651(a)(1)).
135. Id see. 302, § 653(b)(3), 110 Stat at 124 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 653(b)(3)).
The FCC's regulations implementing this provision are found at 47 C.FR. § 76.5100et.seq.
The "open video system" concept replaces the former FCC attempt to create a telco-cable
hybrid, the video dialtone regulations. See id
136. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 187 ("[Tlhe conferees hope that this approach will
encourage common carriers to deploy open video systems and introduce vigorous
competition in entertainment and information markets.").
137. Telecommunications Act, see. 302, § 653, 110 Stat. at 121 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 653(b)(1)(a)).
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video system may not discriminate in favor of their own programming or
that of their affiliates with regard to information presented to subscrib-
ers.' Thus, in its advertising or its provision of technical means of
program selection, the open video systems operator cannot favor its own
programming over that offered by nonaffiliated entities.
In keeping with its hybrid nature, an open video system is not to be
treated, aside from the above requirements, as a common carrier,'39 and
faces only a limited amount of cable-type regulation. There is no need for
a cable franchise, and neither rate regulation, leased access, cable equip-
ment, nor consumer service rules apply.14 Other Cable Act provisions
designed to increase the variety of programming choices, such as PEG
access, must-carry, and program access rules, remain applicable to open
video systems.1
4
'
2. Cable Provision of Telephone Service
The 1996 Act clears away much of the regulatory underbrush which
kept cable operators from providing local telephone service. Most basically,
the Act preempts much of the state and local regulations which governed
the provision of noncable service by cable operators.
First, franchising authorities are barred from imposing any limit on the
provision of telephone or telecommunications service by a cable opera-
tor.'42 Second, franchising authorities are barred from requiring that cable
operators obtain a franchise prior to offering telephone or telecommunica-
tions service. 43 Finally, the franchising authority may not use revenue
from a cable operator's telephone or telecommunications service to calculate
the franchise fee owed by the operator.'44
138. Id see. 302, § 653(b)(1)(e)(i), 110 Stat. at 122-23 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 653(b)(1)(e)(i)).
139. Id see. 302, § 653(c)(3), 110 Stat. at 124 (to be codified at47 U.S.C. § 653(c)(3)).
140. Id. see. 302, § 653(c)(1)(C), 110 Stat. at 123 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 653(c)(1)(C)).
141. Id sec. 302, § 653(c)(1)(B)-(C), 110 Stat. at 122 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 653(c)(1)(B)-(C) (stating, inter alia, that Cable Act sections 611 [47 U.S.C. § 531], 614
[47 U.S.C. § 5341, and 628 [47 U.S.C. § 548], will apply to open video systems).
142. Id see. 303, 110 Stat. at 125 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3)(B)). See also
47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (preempting state and local regulation having the effect of prohibiting
any entity from providing telecommunications service), discussed in text at note 84, supra.
Local governments are also prohibited from requiringthat cable operators offer telecommu-
nications services, except for PEG and leased access channels and institutional networks. See
id.
143. Telecommunications Act, sec. 303, 110 Stat. at 124 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 541(b)(3)(A)(i)).
144. Id., sec. 303, § 622(b), 110 Stat. at 125 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 542(b)).
Under the Cable Act, franchise fees are capped at 5 percent of a cable operator's gross
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3. Mergers between Cable Operators and Local Telephone
Companies
The major restriction on the competitive free-for-all for video
programming is the continued restriction on mergers and buy-outs between
cable companies and local telephone companies within their respective
service areas. This is in keeping with the "two-wire" dream of direct head-
to-head competition between cable and local telephone companies. 145
The 1996 Act contains parallel prohibitions: a local telephone
company cannot acquire more than a 10 percent financial interest in a cable
operator providing service in the telephone company's service area; and a
cable operator cannot acquire more than a 10 percent financial interest in
a local telephone company providing service in the cable operator's
franchise area.'46 Not only are direct mergers prohibited, but joint
ventures between cable operators and telephone companies in the same
market are also proscribed by the 1996 Act.1 47
The joint venture ban is limited, though, to the provision of video
programming and telecommunications services. A joint venture for other
purposes, such as constructing the physical facilities for providing the
programming and services, would be permitted."' Similarly, a local
telephone operator can use a cable system's subscriber drops, the last link
between the cable operator's network and the individual subscriber.'49
This use requires the approval both of the cable operator, as to rates and
conditions, and of the FCC, to ensure that this sharing is of limited scope
and duration. 5°
revenue. Id
145. There is much uncertainty as to how soon it will be economically practicable for
either the cable or telephone company to use one wire to carry both cable service and
telephone service: "[1]t is physically impossible to send a telephone conversation over a
contemporary unswitched cable system, or to push a full-motion video signal through a
switched but low-capacity telco." Botein, supra note 5, at 594. As Professor Botein has
noted, although both cable systems and LECs send electronic signals through wires, "the
resemblance between the two technologies just about ends there; for the foreseeable future,
the two distribution systems are.about as similar as an electric utility and a gas pipeline." Id.
at 569.
146. Telecommunications Act, see. 302, § 652(a)-(b), 110 Stat. at 125 (to be codified at
47 U.S.C. § 652(a)-(b)).
147. Id see. 302, § 652(c), 110 Stat. at 119-20 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 652(c)).
148. H.R CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 174.
149. Id
150. There were some narrow exceptions made to the ban on cableltelco merger.
Telephone companies can combine with co-located cable operators in rural areas.
Telecommunications Act, sec. 302, § 652(d)(1), 110 Stat. at 119 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 652(d)(1)). Underthisprovision, the combined-entitymustservea location with fewer than
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The FCC was also given authority to issue waivers, permitting
cable/telco combinations.'' Prior to issuing such a waiver, the FCC must
determine either that the cable or telephone company faces economic
distress; the cable system or telephone facilities would not be economically
viable; or the public interest clearly outweighs the anticompetitive effects
of the combination. 5 Additionally, the local franchising authority must
approve such waiver before it becomes effective. 5 1
4. Other Cable Ownership Issues
While the drafters of the 1996 Act maintained numerous provisions to
limit co-ownership of cable and telco systems, a deregulatory mindset
pervaded other cable ownership issue. In an effort to strengthen cable as a
player in the new competitive marketplace, many previous restrictions on
cable sale and ownership were lifted.
Under the former Cable Act provisions, "trafficking" in cable systems
was limited. Cable operators were barred from selling a cable system for
three years after acquisition or initial construction. ' 54 That three-year
holding period has now been eliminated. 5 As under the old law, fran-
chising authorities are given 120 days to decide whether to approve a
request for approval of a transfer of system ownership, with the transfer
35,000 inhabitants outside an urbanized area, and must serve no more than 10 percent of the
households in the telephone company's service area.
There were also some provisions that were written to apply to only a tiny number of
situations. For example, under one exception, merger is permitted if the cable system either:
1) is not owned by one of the 50 largest cable operators, is outside the top 100 television
markets, and serves no more than 17,000 subscribers, with at least 8000 urban and 6000 non-
urban; or 2) serves fewer than 20,000 subscribers, of whom at most 12,000 live in urban
areas, and is combining with a small telephone company, one with less than $100 million
in annual revenue. Id see. 302, § 652(d)(4)-(5), 110 Stat. at 121 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 652(d)(4)-(5)).
A special exception was also carved out for some of the extremely few areas where a
competitive cable market existed prior to the 1996 Act. Under this provision, in all but the
top 25 largest television markets, a telephone company will be able to merge with a local
cable operator, as long as: 1) It is not the largest cable operator in the area; 2) The acquired
cable system is not owned by one of the 50 largest MSOs; 3) The area's larger cable system
is owned by one of 10 largest MSOs; and 4) The acquired cable system must have obtained
a franchise covering the same area as the largest system as of May 1, 1995. Id sec. 302,
§ 652(d)(3), 110 Stat. at 121 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 652(d)(3)).
151. Id see. 302, § 652(d)(6), 110 Stat. at 120 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 652(d)(6)).
152. Id. sec. 302, § 652(d)(6)(A), 110 Stat. at 121 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 652Cd)(6)(A)).
153. Id.
154. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1994) (repealed 1996).
155. Telecommunications Act, sec. 301(i), 110 Stat. at 117 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 537)).
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treated as granted if no decision is rendered within that time.1 56
Similarly, restrictions on cable operator co-ownership of other forms
of electronic communication were also eased. First, the FCC was instructed
to eliminate its restriction on cable operator ownership of a broadcast
network. 57 To prevent anticompetitive abuse by such co-ownership, the
FCC was also instructed to ensure carriage, channel positioning and
nondiscriminatory treatment of nonaffiliated broadcasters by the ca-
ble/network combination.1 58
The 1996 Act is not quite so bold with the issue of cable cross-
ownership of broadcast stations in the same market. While the 1996 Act
removes the statutory ban on such combinations, 59 the FCC is left to
determine the ultimate question as to their permissibility. In fact, the
drafters of the 1996 Act specified that they did not intend, by their statutory
repeal, to indicate one way or the other whether the FCC should change its
existing cross-ownership ban. 6 '
Finally, the ban on cable ownership of either colocated SMATV
systems or colocated MMDS systems is eased. Cable ownership of either
of these two video delivery systems will now be permitted in any area
where a cable operator is subject to effective competition.1 61
IV. BROADCASTERS iN THE NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS
MARKETPLACE
The lowest-tech players in the telecommunications revolution, the
broadcasters, received significant regulatory relief from the 1996 Act. In
addition to the changes in the rules governing cable ownership of stations
and networks,162 broadcasters also benefited from the deregulatory
tradewinds. Ironically, though, most of the changes affecting broadcasters
actually serve to limit intramedia competition.
For example, in deciding whether to renew a broadcast license, the
FCC is now barred from considering the proposal of any alternate potential
156. Idr sec. 301, 110 Stat, at 117 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 537).
157. Id see. 202(f)(1), 110 Stat. at 111 (revising 47 C.F.R. § 76.501).
158. Id see. 202(f)(2), I10 Stat. at 111.
159. Id sec. 202(i), 110 Stat. at 112 (eliminating 47 U.S.C. § 533(a)(1)).
160. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 164 (discussing FCC review of 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.501).
161. Telecommunications Act, see. 202(i)(6), 110 Stat. at 112 (adding 47 U.S.C.
§ 533(a)(3)). For a discussionof"effective competition," see text accompanying notes 111-
16, supra.
162. See text accompanying supra notes 154-61.
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broadcaster.'63 Instead, the FCC must only consider whether the broad-
caster has committed "serious" violations of FCC rules and has served the
public interest.'
Not only is renewal easier,'65 the terms of the license have been
increased. Instead of a five-year license for television and seven-year for
radio, all broadcasters will now enjoy an eight-year license period.'
Many of the limits on multiple ownership of broadcast licenses have
been eased or eliminated. On a national level, the limit on the number of
AM or FM radio stations which can be controlled by one entity was
eliminated.'67 The national limit on the number of television stations was
also removed,168 and now the only remaining national ceiling is that one
entity cannot own television stations which, together, reach more than 35
percent of the nation's television households. 69
The rules governing multiple-ownership within a particular local
market have been relaxed, though not eliminated. For radio, a complicated
matrix was created, with the number of permissible co-owned stations
dependant both on the number of available commercial radio stations and
whether the stations are concentrated in the same "service," either the AM
or FM band: 7'
163. Telecommunications Act, sec. 204, § 309(k), 110 Stat. at 115 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 309(k)(4)). In fact, this subsection is entitled, "Competitor Consideration
Prohibited." Id
164. Id sec. 204, § 309(k)(1), 110 Stat. at 112 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §309(k)(1)).
165. In practice, though, broadcast renewal has always been a virtual sure-thing. See, e.g.,
Monroe Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 900 F.2d 351, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Silberman, J.,
concurring) ("Quite obviously the FCC shrinks from the prospect of taking the license away
from the incumbent, but ... it is hard to see how the FCC can justify the weight it places
on incumbency in [the renewal] case.").
166. Telecommunications Act, see. 203, § 307(c), 110 Stat. at 112 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 307(c)(1)).
167. Id. see. 202(a), 110 Stat. at 110 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555).
168. Id see. 202(c)(1)(A), 110 Stat. at (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555).
169. Id sec. 202(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.35555). This is
an increase from the previous national cap of 25 percent. See 47 C.F.R. §73.3555 (1995)
(now revised).
170. Telecommunications Act, sec. 202(b), 110 Stat. at 110 (to be codified at 47 C.F.RL
§ 73.3555).
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Number of Commercial Maximum Number of All Maximum Number of
Stations in a Market Stations in That Market Same-Service Stations
45 or more 8 5
30-44 7 4
15-29 6 4
14 or fewer 5 3
Congress was not willing to make a final decision as to local
ownership limits for television stations. Instead, the 1996 Act directs the
FCC to "conduct a rulemaking proceeding to determine whether to retain,
modify or eliminate" the current ban on owning more than one station in
a market (the so-called "duopoly rule"). 7  While not expressing any
position on this issue directly, Congress did state in the Conference Report
that if the duopoly rules were revised, VHF-VHF combinations should only
be allowed in "compelling circumstances.""
Congress also liberalized the rules as to television/radio co-ownership.
Prior to the Act, the FCC permitted common ownership of a radio and a
television station in the same market only if thirty broadcast owners were
operating in that market, and the market was in any of the top twenty-five
largest." The 1996 Act extends that policy to include any of the top fifty
markets.1 4
The 1996 Act also provides a little more flexibility than in the past for
broadcast television networks to combine. Previously, all television
networks were barred from common-ownership. 75 The "Big-4" networks
(ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox) are still barred from merging either with each
other or the fledgling WB and UPN networks. Mergers are permitted,
though, between either the WB and UPN networks, or between any existing
network and some new network formed after the Act. 76
Perhaps the strangest part of the 1996 Act, involves "Advanced
Television Services" (ATV), the allocation of the spectrum which will be
171. Id. see. 202(c)(2), 110 Stat. at I I I (referring to current duopoly rule at 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3555).
172. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 163.
173. 47 C.F.RL § 73.3555 (1995) (now revised).
174. Telecommunications Act, sec. 202(d), I 10 Stat. at I I.
175. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(g) (now revised).
176. Telecommunications Act, see 202(c), 110 Stat. at 11l. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(g)
(as revised).
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used for digital, high definition television.' Whomever gets awarded this
portion of the spectrum stands to enjoy an enormous windfall, in large
measure due to the variety of services that will be able to be transmitted
simultaneously by the license holder.
The early winners in this legislative slugfest were the existing
broadcasters. The 1996 Act states that if ATV licenses are issued, they are
to be awarded to only those who are already licensed broadcasters.'78
But even that requirement in the Act did not end the dispute. Shortly
before Congress completed its work on the Act, political opposition to this
"governmental give-away" began to build. In order to prevent the issue
from scuttling the rest of the Act, and to avoid a painful rewriting process,
Congressional leaders secured a promise from the FCC that the Commission
would not issue ATV licenses until Congress held further hearings and had
the opportunity to revise the plan laid out in the 1996 Act. 7 9 Thus, the
actual control over ATV is still not determined, and it has yet to be seen
whether the broadcasters of the twentieth century are permitted to become
the high-tech HDTV station owners of the future.
V DIRECT REGULATION OF CONTENT OF TELECoMMUNICATIONS
There is an almost Holmesian feel to much of the 1996 Act, an
underlying conviction that the creation of multiple carriers of information
will benefit society by multiplying the number of voices in the marketplace
of ideas.' Or, as Judge Learned Hand saw it, "right conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any
kind of authoritative selection.'' The 1996 Act, accordingly, focuses
largely on creating competition between carriers of information, and trusts
to the market to determine the content which is carried.
All freedoms, though, are capable of abuse.' In particular, not only
was the marketplace for violent and sexually oriented programming getting
177. Telecommunications Act, see 201, § 336(g), 110 Stat. at 110 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 335(g)).
178. Id. sec. 201, § 336(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 107 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 335(a)(1)).
179. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Blake & Ellen P. Goodman, Second Byte: Congressional
Excursion into Digital TV, 14 CoMM. LAW. at 3-5 (1996).
180. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting)
("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market .... ).
181. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S.
1 (1944).
182. "Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; and in no
instance is this more true than that of the press." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 271 (196) (quoting James Madison in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
CoNsTrMrrboN 571 (1876).
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larger, but Congress feared that too many children were wandering through
its stalls. Accordingly, in contradistinction to the content-neutrality of the
rest of the 1996 Act, several provisions dealing directly with such
programming were included, under the appellation "Communications
Decency Act of 1996.I"
A. Broadcast Violence and Indecency
For broadcast television, Congress's primary interest was to create a
technological barrier to objectionable programming, but leave control over
that barrier in the hands of individual parents. The easier part of that task
was the mandating of the technological barrier. First, all video programming
that has been rated must be transmitted with its rating." Second, all
television sets sold in the United States will contain a so-called "V-Chip"
that will block out all programming which has been rated unsuitable for
children due to its sexual or violent content."8 5 The FCC is charged with
choosing the starting date for this requirement, as long as that date is after
February 8, 1998, two years after enactment of the 1996 Act.' 86
The tricky part of the plan, however, is to design a rating system that
does not violate the First Amendment. Any system in which the Govern-
ment is choosing what programs to bar is, of course, fraught with
constitutional peril.187 The 1996 Act contains the threat that the FCC will
create its own ratings guidelines.8'8 The only way to avoid a government-
ally created rating system is if the broadcasters, along with cable television
operators, follow the model of the film industry,8 9 and do the rating
themselves."'
183. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, see. 501, 110 Stat. 56, 133.
184. Id. see. 551(b), § 303(w)(2), 110 Stat. at 140 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 303(w)(2)).
185. Id. see. 551(c), § 303(x), 110 Stat at 141 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303 (x)).
Actually, this only applies to television sets with a diagonal screen of 13 inches or greater.
Id.
186. Id. see. 551(e)(2), I10 Stat. at 142.
187. See, e.g., Freedman v. Md., 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390
U.S. 676 (1968).
188. Telcommunications Act, sec. 551(b), § 303(w)(1), 110 Stat. at 140 (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)(1)); id. see. 551(e)(2), 110 Stat. at 142. These guidelines, which are
to be promulgated after an advisory board issues recommendations, are not intended to be
formal "requirements," that broadcasters must use. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 195.
However, if any rating system is used, the rating must be transmitted with the programming.
Id. see. 551(b), § 303(w)(2), 110 Stat at 140 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)(2)).
189. See generally Douglas Ayer et al., Self-Censorship in the Movie Industy: An
Historical Perspective of Law and Social Change, 1970 Wisc. L. REv. 791 (1970).
190. Telecommunications Act, see. 551(e)(1), 110 Stat at 142. The broadcast industry,
in part due to their desire to please the same congressional powers that would be distributing
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There are several possible side-effects from the V-Chip proposal that
may prevent it from achieving its goal. First, since the 1996 Act requires
that the ratings identify "programming that contains sexual, violent, or other
indecent material about which parents should be informed,''. it is
possible that much prime time television programming will be "identified."
If that happens, parents will be forced to choose between having almost all
broadcasting blocked in the evenings, or letting all of the material,
appropriate and inappropriate, into their homes. Secondly, the FCC's current
ban on indecent broadcasting was upheld by the Court because "broadcast-
ing is uniquely accessible to children," since offensive broadcasts could not
"be withheld from the young without restricting the expression at its
source."'"2 Once the V-Chip is in place, though, such selective withhold-
ing of offensive material will be possible, and the prime rationale for
distinguishing broadcast indecency from bookstores and movie theaters will
be gone. The unintended result of the V-Chip proposal, then, would be that
broadcasters would show far mom sexually explicit, indecent, and violent
programming, contending that children were now to be protected by
technology.'93
B. Cable Indecency
Cable television, in a sense, may present a picture of what the future
of broadcasting looks like. Lock-boxes and similar devices to block out
particular, unwanted programming, have not only been available, but, since
1984, cable operators have been required to offer them to subscribers.'94
Accordingly, courts have uniformly found bans on cable indecency to be
unconstitutional. 195
Nonetheless (or perhaps, predictably), complaints over the explicitness
of cable programming have continued. Both the 1992 Cable Act and the
the lucrative spectrum for Advanced Television, see text accompanying supranotes 177-79,
announced their willingness to establish "voluntary" rules for rating programming.
191. Id. see. 551(e)(1), 110 Stat. at 142 (emphasis added).
192. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
193. This is what occurred in the dial-a-porn case, where a ban on telephone indecency
was struck down due to the availability of "less restrictive means" for protecting children.
Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989).
194. 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2) (1994).
195. See, e.g., Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420-21 (11th Cir. 1985); Community
Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F.Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985), aff'dsub noma. Wilkinson
v. Jones, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd without opinion, 480 U.S. 926 (1987).
Obscenity, which is not constitutionally protected, can be banned from cable television, and
the 1996 Act raised the penalty for transmitting obscene cable programming from $10,000
to $100,000. Telecommunications Act, see. 503, 110 Stat. at 136 (amending 47 U.S.C.
§ 559).
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1996 Telecommunications Act contain numerous provisions attempting to
deal with the issue, but much of the legislative plan became entangled in
constitutional challenges.
The 1996 Act, for example, required the scrambling of any "sexually
explicit adult programming," or indecent programming on a channel
"primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming."'1 96 Prior to
scrambling the signal, the program could not be shown during any time of
day, 'vhen a significant number of children are likely to view it.' 197
Almost immediately upon enactment, this provision was found to be
constitutionally suspect. Again, it was held that lock boxes were less-
restrictive alternatives, which would adequately protect parents.198
A more modest, content-neutral scrambling requirement imposed by
the 1996 Act has not been challenged. This section requires the scrambling,
at no cost, of any channel at the request of a cable subscriber.'99 An
earlier Senate version of this provision had included the additional standard
that the programming to be scrambled be, in the judgement of the
subscriber, "unsuitable for children," but this was dropped from the final
bill. 2°0
Another area of interest to legislators has been programming offered
on leased and public access channels. These channels are programmed by
those not affiliated with the cable operator, and traditionally have been
carried free from operator censorship.20 ' Both the 1992 Cable Act and the
1996 Telecommunications Act contain provisions permitting cable operators
to refuse to carry offensive programming on these channels.02 In a split
decision, of sorts, the Supreme Court ruled that the 1992 provisions on
leased access were constitutional, but that the public access provision
196. Telcommunications Act, sec. 505, § 641(a), 110 Stat. at 136 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 641(a)). "Scramble" is defined to mean rearranging the content of the signal sent
into the home so that the programming cannot be seen or heard in an understandable manner.
Id. see. 505, § 641(c), 110 Stat. at 136 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 641(c)).
197. Id. see. 505, § 641(b), 110 Stat. at 136 (to be codified at47 U.S.C. § 641(b)). The
FCC ruled that unscrambled adult programming could only be shown between the hours of
10 p.m. and 6 a.m.
198. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 813 (D. Del.
1996).
199. Telecommunications Act, sec. 504, § 640(a), 110 Stat. at 136 (to be codifed at 47
U.S.C. § 640(a)).
200. H.1L CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 192.
201. 47 U.S.C. §§ 531, 532 (1994).
202. The 1992 Cable Act permitted operators to refuseto carry access programming that
depicted "sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner," Section
10(a) and 10(c). The 1996 Telecommunications Act permitted operators to refuse to carry
accessprogramming,"which contains obscenity, indecency or nudity." Telecommunications
Act, sec. 506, 110 Stat. at 136-37 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 531(e), 532(c)(2)).
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violated the First Amendment.2 3 The primary differences between the two
provisions, according to a plurality of the Court, was that public access was
imposed and regulated by franchising authorities, and not the Federal
Government, and that there was no record of a nationwide problem with
"patently offensive" public access programming."" Granting cable
operators the power to bar public access programming would "greatly
increase the risk that certain categories of programming (say borderline
offensive programs) will not appear."2 5
Although the 1996 Act's provisions were not at issue in this case, it
seems likely that only the leased access provisions will be enforceable. One
court has suggested that the 1996 Act provision permitting operators to bar
"obscene" public access programming would be constitutional, since such
programming is unprotected by the First Amendment.20 6 The same reasons
that led to the 1992 public access provisions being held unconstitution-
al-the role of local franchising authorities, the lack of a record of national
problems with public access, and the risk that "borderline" public access
programming will be barred-apply with equal force to the 1996 public
access provisions.
One area of potential difficulty arises because the 1992 Act imposed
liability on cable operators for carrying obscene public and leased access
programming.20 7 It is, however, unconstitutional to impose liability for
programming that one is mandated to carry."' Unless the cable operator
is relieved of all liability for public access programming, control of such
programming, with the attendant risk that certain programming "will not
appear," will need to be returned to the operator.
C. Internet Indecency
The 1996 Act does not deal in great detail with the Internet." 9
Generally, the philosophy seems to be that the highly populated world of
203. Denver Area Educational Tele-Comm. Consortium, Jnc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374
(1996). The Court also struck down a 1992 provision requiring cable operators to segregate
'patently offensive" leased access programming on a single channel and only permit
subscriber access upon written request. 1992 Cable Act, Section 10(b).
204. DenverEducational, 116 S.Ct. 2374, 2394-97. This part of Justice Breyer's opinion
was joined by only Justices Stevens and Souter.
205. Id. at 2397.
206. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 981 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
207. 47 U.S.C. § 558 (1994). This provision was upheld in Time Warner, 93 F.3d 957.
208. See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535 (1959).
209. For a general description of the Internet, see Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 925
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (describing the Internet as, "a collection of more than 50,000 networks
linking some nine million host computers in ninety countries ....").
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networks, web pages and on-line services was sufficiently competitive
without federal intervention. The major area where Congress did attempt to
regulate computer services involved the presentation of indecent material
which could be accessed by minors.
In addition to several noncontroversial provisions,1 ° the 1996 Act
criminalized the use of interactive computer services to display "patently
offensive" sexually explicit material so that it was "available" to mi-
nors.2 ' This provision was held unconstitutional by two different three-
judge courts.212 Each court found that there was no practical way, under
current technology, for most providers of on-line information, to control
who receives their communication. As Judge Sloviter wrote: "[Lt is either
technologically impossible or economically prohibitive for many of the
plaintiffs to comply with the [Act] without seriously impeding their posting
of online material which adults have a constitutional right to access."2 3
A perhaps more successful approach will be the encouragement of
nongovernmental players to police the Internet. The 1996 Act protects what
it terms "good samaritan" blocking of certain programming.214 This
section states that those who run interactive computer services may not "be
held liable" if they voluntarily restrict access to material they consider, in
good faith, to be "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent
harassing or otherwise objectionable." 15
210. For example, the 1996 Act makes it a crime to use telecommunication devices to
induce a minor to engage in any illegal sexual act, Telecommunications Act, sec. 508, 110
Stat. at 137 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)), or to annoy or harass another person
either with obscene and indecent communication or by repeated telephone calls. Id. sec. 502,
§ 223(a)(1)(B), (D)-(E), 110 Stat. at 133 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B), (D)-
(E)). The Act also clarifies that it is a felony to use a computer to transmit obscene material.
Id. 110 Stat. at 137 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1462). This last amendment probably does
not change pre-existing obscenity law, which was generally interpreted to reach that result.
See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 704-05 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming obscenity
convictions for the operation of a computer bulletin board).
211. Telecommunications Act, see. 502, § 223(d), 110 Stat. at 133 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 223(d)).
212. Shea, 930 F. Supp. 916; ACLU v Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The
Supreme Court has agreed to review the ruling inACLUv. Reno, 65 U.S.L.W. 3411 (1996).
213. ACLU v Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 853.
214. Telecommunications Act, sec. 509, § 230(c), 110 Stat. at 138 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 230 (c)).
215. Id. sec. 509, § 230(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 138 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)).
The 1996 Act also protects those who provide connections to the Internet or networks they
do not control, are not responsible for on-line content. Id. see. 502, § 223(e), 110 Stat. at
134 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)). This protection is reserved for "entities that
simply offer general access to the Internet and other online content." H.R CoNF. REP. No.
104-458, at 190.
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The stated purpose of this provision is "to overrule"2 6 the decision
of the New York trial court in Stratton-Oakmont v Prodigy.217 The issue
in that case was whether, Prodigy, an on-line computer service which
operated numerous "forums" for subscriber's to use to share information,
should be viewed as a "publisher" responsible for defamatory comments on
its forums, or a "conduit" with minimal liability. Because Prodigy had
declared itself to be "family oriented" and used both software and personnel
to police the forums for inappropriate language and topics, the court held
that Prodigy would bear legal responsibility, just like a traditional
newspaper publisher.21 This theory would force on-line service providers
into choosing between foregoing all control of their service or engaging in
the task of reviewing, and censoring, thousands of postings daily.2 19
The 1996 Act attempts to give service providers a middle ground.
They will not be held responsible for content they do not'produce simply,
"because they have restricted access to objectionable material." '  Thus,
a service provider need not adopt a totally hands-off policy to escape
liability for bulletin board comments.221
While this should give some comfort to service providers who want
to offer a "family" service, the protection given by the 1996 Act is not
complete. If a service provider bars a message for a reason other than those
listed in the Act, it presumably would be treated as a publisher of all the
messages it posts.
A Prodigy spokesperson had stated, "What we do with our bulletin
boards is identical to the policy taken by most newspapers on letters to the
editor. No obscenity, no slander, no libel, no commercialism." m It is not
at all clear that this policy is covered by the good samaritan provision.
Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the phrase "otherwise objection-
able," probably will not be interpreted so broadly as to cover anything to
which a service provider like Prodigy might object.2" Ironically, then, an
216. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 194
217. 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1995).
218. Id
219. See generally Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers:
Identifying the 'Speaker' Within the New Media, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 79, 116-124
(1995).
220. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 194.
221. Cf Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding that CompuServe was not responsible because it had "little or no editorial control"
over the content of the postings.).
222. Felicity Barringer, Electronic Bulletin Boards Need Editing. No They Don't, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 11, 1990 at Section 4, p.4 quoting Brian Ek, spokesperson for Prodigy.
223. This doctrine states that "where general words follow an enumeration.., by words
of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed to their
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on-line service provider who removes some defamatory material, may well
end up responsible for any defamatory material that remains, while a similar
provider who permits all the material to be posted would escape liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1996 Telecommunications Act has forever transformed the
regulatory landscape.' 4 The Act itself is complex; simultaneously detailed
and incomplete. The thousands of pages of FCC rulemaking only increase
the difficulty of comprehending the enormous changes brought about by the
Act.
Nonetheless, there are basic themes that permeate the Act. The Act
contemplates the creation of competition across the full telecommunications
field, even in areas such as local telephone service and cable television
service that had previously been monopoly controlled.2" The main
combatants in this new marketplace will tend to be even larger companies
than those currently dominating the scene. One can well "envision a future
of titanic telecommunications and titanic telecommunicators, a competitive
field dominated by highly capitalized, deep-pocket giants. '2 6
The hope is that this new marketplace will create not only the
advantages of competition but the unforeseeable benefits which result from
a new synergetic relationship between previously separated businesses and
technologies: "The opening of all telecommunications markets to all
providers will blur traditional industry distinctions and bring new packages
of services, lower prices and increased innovation to American consum-
ers.' ' 2
There are numerous dangers, however, that will have to be averted in
order for the Act to be successful. The first is that existing monopolies,
such as the BOCs or cable operators, will leverage their current power
either to gain an unfair advantage in a competitive market, or to retain their
advantage in the local arena.228
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general
kind or class as those specifically mentioned." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (6th ed.
1990).
224. "From this point forward, telecommunications law starts with the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996." Jim Chen, Antitrust Issues in the Telecommunications and Software
Industries: Titanic Telecommunications, 25 SW. U.L. REv. 535, 537 (1996).
225. See text accompanying supra notes 8-16.
226. Chen, supra note 224, at 545. See also id at 551 (stating that in the local telephone
market, "we should expect only one type of entrant: big.").
227. Implementation Order, Part II, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,475, 45,480 (1996).
228. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 14, at 522 (stating "There is no question that the risk
ofcross-subsidyis highest-when the regulated monopolies enter an adjacent market with high
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The second danger is that the cure to the first is worse than the
disease. The primary strategy for creating new competition is that the Act
permits, indeed encourages, smaller players, "to combine, collude, and
combat" the entrenched monopolies.229 Accordingly, there is a lessening
of intramedia competition (such as the ability for one entity to control more
broadcast stations), in the hope of creating intermedia competition.
Additionally, certain cross-media combinations (such as between cable
operators and broadcast networks, or between long-distance and local
telephone providers) are permitted in the hope of improving the chances of
"intermodal" competition.23
If these new combinations do not compete with one another, then the
Act may have only permitted the creation of large, deregulated monopolists
(or oligopolists). The FCC, local regulators, and Congress must watch
carefully the unfolding of the new telecommunications field so that we may
see these large entities truly battling each other for the hearts and wallets
of consumers."'
Even if there is such competition, the FCC will have one more critical
task: the need to ensure that there is a place for the smaller player. Be it in
reselling of local phone service, or a programmer seeking one channel on
a cable or Open Video System, there must always be some way for new
entry into the telecommunications field.
Finally, amidst all the wiring and rewiring, merging and affiliating,
one thought should be kept in mind. At the end of the day, what will be
most important for the American citizen is not the quantity of fiber optics,
coaxial cable or microwave antennae that line our streets, but the quality of
the information that enters our businesses and homes.
joint costs."). But see Chen, supra note 224, at 552 (stating local telephone service is "a
contestable, albeit imperfectly competitive market .....
229. Chen, supra note 224, at 558.
230. Id. at 551.
23 1. See, e.g., Botein, supra note 5, at 597 (stating that "both the telco and cable
industries may end up with three or four dominant players - which in turn may merge or
form strategic alliances with each other"); Chen, supra note 224, at 557 (referring to "the
possibility of procompetitive combinations").
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